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ROBERT G. WElL, Appellant, v. HARVEY 0. BARTHEL
et al., Respondents.
[1] Pleading- Demurrer- As Admission.-A demurrer reaches

[2]

(3]
[4]

[5]

only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may
be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.
Judgments-Res Judicata-Pleading.-When a former judgment is properly pleaded in a complaint, it may be considered
by the trial court in determining whether it is res judicata
of plaintiff's cause of action.
Id.-Res Judicata.-A final judgment is res judicata of the
issues involved therein where the court had jurisdiction.
Id.-Res Judicata-Matters Concluded.-A judgment in a
prior action terminating all interest of the purchasers under
an executory land sales contract, enjoining them from asserting any right in such contract or title to such land, declaring
that the vendors were the owners of the property in fee simple
subject to its sale by order of court, and foreclosing all equity
of redemption is res judicata in a subsequent action by the
assignee of such purchasers to compel redemption and to quiet
title to such realty which had been sold by judicial sale.
Id.- Res Judicata- Validity of Judgment.-An erroneous
judgment is as conclusive as a correct one.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo
County. C. C. McDonald, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to compel redemption and to quiet title to real property. Judgment for defendants, entered on an order sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint without leave to
amend, affirmed.
James S. Eddy and Douglas C. Busath for Appellant.
Robert M. Cole for Respondents.
Driver & Driver as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent<J.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 62; Am.Jur., Pleading, §§ 207,
238 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 165; Am.Jur., Judgments, §§ 161,
162.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 84(4); [2] Judgments,
§441; [3] Judgments, §338;) [4) Judgments, §412(4); [5] Judgments,§ 347.
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[4] In the present case the record discloses that the
Barthels formerly were owners of a tract of unimproved land.
In 1948, they entered into an oral contract, which was superseded by a later oral agreement, to sell the land and an abandoned streetcar on the
to the Burtons. If the consideration was not paid in cash, the Barthe1s were to receive a
note secured by a purchase money trust deed. The Burtons
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imtook possession of the property and
provements but, although demands were made upon them, they
refused to pay the purchase price or to execute a note. In
October of that year, a third oral agreement was made, the
Burtons agreeing to pay immediately $5,000 for the land and
to perform certain other obligations which were incident to the
original agreements.
The Burtons continued in possession of the property for
more than a year and one-half without paying the agreed
purchase price. During that time, they continued to make improvements on the property for which they incurred mechanics' liens and claims of materialmen in the sum of about
$5,700. Despite repeated demands and a tender of a deed to
the property by the Barthels, the purchase price remained
unpaid. The Burtons resided in one of the buildings on the
property without paying rent, and the Barthels were deprived
of the crops from several walnut trees during the period of
occupancy.
Finally, the Barthels brought suit against the Burtons.
Their complaint was in two counts. In the first one, they
alleged the execution of the oral agreements, the defendants'
breach, their unlawful holding of possession of the premises,
and losses assertedly resulting therefrom. The second count
pleaded that the Barthels were the owners of the property in
question and that the Burtons claimed a right in it adverse to
them. The prayer was for a cancellation of the oral agreement
and a decree adjudging the defendants to be without interest
in the property and enjoining them from asserting any claim
to it. It was also prayed that the sheriff be commanded to put
them into possession of the realty and to evict the Burtons.
They also sought damages.
The trial court found that the Burtons had breached their
oral agreement and that ''Plaintiffs are the owners of said
property, and Defendants, and anyone acting through them,
have no right, title, or interest therein. The Plaintiffs have
owned said real property at all times herein mentioned, subject
only to said oral agreements.'' The Burtons had erected substantial improvements on the property of an uncertain value,
and the court found that liens had accrued against the realty
for mechanics' services and materialmen's claims; that the
Burtons were in unlawful possession of the premises, and that
the Barthels had been damaged by loss of use of the property
and loss of the walnut crops.
It was adjudged: {1) that the interest of the Burtons, and
of any person claiming through them, in the real property or
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the oral contract ''is
nd foreelosed'' ;
(2) that the Bm·tons and such other persons were enjoined
from aserting ''any right, title or interest in and to said contract or said real property, which arose before the date of this
Decree":
that the Barthels were the o·wners of the real
property in fee simple subject to its sale
order of the court
''in the manner provided by law for sale
to execution upon real property";
that title was to be
in
the purchaser from all claims by either the Rlrthels or the
Burtons, or persons acting through them;
tlwt they were
enjoined from asserting any claim or demand arising prior to
the date of the decrre and ( 6) that "all
of redemptioll
of any of the aforesaid persons is hereby foreclosed."
No appeal was taken from the decree and it became final.
Pursuant to the decree, the property was sold at public auction
to the Barthels and the proceeds from the sale distributed as
ordered by the court.
From the foregoing facts it is apparent that the very issue
which is presented in the instant case was before the trial court
in the prior action, and that it gave a judgment contrary to the
present contentions of the plaintiff, which expressly foreclosed
"all equity of redemption of any of the aforesaid persons,"
which includes the plaintiff. Since it appears that in the
prior action the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties thereto, and the judgment in such
action has become final, it may not now be attacked by plaintiff
on the ground that it was incorrect. [5] In Panos v. Great
Western Packing Co. this court, speaking through Mr. Chief
Justice Gibson, succinctly stated the applicable rule thus:
''An erroneous judgment is as conclusive as a correct one.''
(21 Cal.2d 636, 640 [4] [134 P.2d 242].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-1 dissent.
'l'he majority opinion states that there is no question here
of whether a trial court may take judici.al notice of a judgment
in another action in ruling on a demurrer based on res judicata
because the judgment ''was pleaded.'' The record does not
bear out that statement. In the complaint it is alleged that
there was a judgment rendered on a stated day and the aspects
thereof beneficial to plaintiff were alleged but the entire judg-
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deemed conelusive:

former judgment upon litiis thereby waived in
§ 233, p. 214; 50 C.J.S.,
Petroleurn Co., Ltd. v. Long,
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v.
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Nor can respondents avail
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It is the general
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or concluded in the same court.'
l Citations.] The
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of its own records 'is limited to
case.' " In "Willson v.
705, 711
P.2d
, it was said: "To hold that a court
may generally take
notice of another proceeding with
a view to determining whether it is a bar to the pending suit,
would do away with the rule that the defense of res judicata
may not be raised by demurrer unless the facts appear in the
complaint, in those cases where the judgment relied on as a
bar was rendered by the same court.'' The general rule is
apparently subject to an
In Christiana v. Rose,
100 CaLApp.2d 46, 52-53 [222 P.2d 891], the court said: "It
has been held
in the interests of
the court may
take judicial notice of proceedings in other cases in the same
court. (Willson v.
Nat. Bank, 21 Cal.2d 705,
711 [134 P.2d 800]; Calhoun v. Calhottn, 81 Cal.App.2d 297,
302 [183 P.2d 922] ) In the instant case the appellant in his
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complaint referred to the
death action and
cally alleged the date of the case, its file number in the clerk's
office, and the date the appellate court affirmed. Under such
circumstances, there can be no doubt but that this court may
look at and consider the records in the wrongful death action.
(See Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, 92 Cal.App.2d 448, 453
[207 P.2d 647] .) " (Emphasis added.) The Calhoun case
in the same
involved taking judicial notice of a former
court between the same parties; the Christiana case involved
another case which had been appealed; the Popcorn Equipment Company case pointed out that ''Only in exceptional
cases will the court depart from the general rule, for example
in order to avoid a resulting unreasonable hardship. Under
certain circumstances the Supreme Cour~ will take judicial
notice of the records of that court, although not pleaded in the
trial court, when brought to the court's attention in some appropriate manner." (Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, 92
Cal.App.2d 448,453 [207 P.2d 647].) In Bank of America v.
Button, 23 Cal.App.2d 651 [74 P.2d 81], it was said (p. 653) :
"It is the general rule that courts will not take judicial notice
of other actions even though pending in the same court.
(Estate of Fulton, 8 Cal.App.2d 423 [48 P.2d 120]; Bro1lJn v.
Brown, 83 Cal.App. 74 [256 P. 595]; Ralphs v. Hensler, 97
Cal. 296 [32 P. 243] .) This rule has been made subject to exception, in the discretion of the court. (Sewell v. Johnson, 165
Cal. 762 [134 P. 704, Ann.Cas. 1915B 645]; City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, 217 Cal. 184 [17 P.2d 993] .) The exception is
only invoked in unusual cases where unreasonable hardship
would otherwise result. This does not appear to us to be such
a case." (See also 10 Cal.Jur., §52; 5 Cal.Jur.Supp., §52.)
In Johnston v. Ota, 43 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [110 P.2d 507], the
court stated the general rule and said: ''The only exception
to the rule is where unreasonable hardship would result.
(Bank of America v. Button, supra.) Although the judgment
pleaded was an adjudication of the matter at bar and may have
been rendered by the same court upon the same cause of action,
and although such judgment and its supporting papers may be
on file in the same court still the party pleading such prior
adjudication carried the burden of establishing his plea which
can be done only by actual proof of its records. (Glaze v.
Bogle, supra [105 Ga. 295 (31 S.E. 169)].)
''It must appear either upon the face of the record or be
shown by extrinsic evidence that the precise issue raised in the
second action was determined in the former suit. • • •
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''There was no circumstance in the instant case that would
have justified the court's taking judicial notice of the judgment pleaded or of the pleadings which preceded it. . . . ''
(Emphasis added.)
If the court is now going to take a different position it should
overrule those cases. However, it will also have to overrule
the legislative declaration in section 1962, subdivision 6, of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
There is an additional reason why the demurrer should not
have been sustained and the prior judgment considered.
Plaintiff's action was in part for declaratory relief and he
stated a controversy between himself and defendants thus presenting a case for such relief. ''Thus, it has been pointed out
that it is rare that a demurrer is an appropriate pleading for
the defendant to file in an action for declaratory relief, it
being more appropriate for the defendant to admit the existence of the controversy, and if the defendant feels that the
plaintiff has not alleged the facts giving rise to the controversy
fully and accurately, or that the contentions between the
parties are not properly stated, he should plead such facts and
contentions affirmatively as he understands them to be, and
seek explicit judicial confirmation of his contentions." (15
Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 36; see Maguire v. Hibernia
Sav. & Loan Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R.
1062] ; Anderson v. Stansbury, 38 Cal.2d 707 [242 P.2d 305])
and that rule is particularly applicable to the interpretation
of a former judgment (Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840 [168
P.2d 5]).
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
18, 1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

